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Abstract
In R v Kirkpatrick, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia held that consent to sexual
activity cannot be established where a man proceeds with unprotected vaginal intercourse
when his sexual partner has insisted on a condom. While this finding should be
uncontroversial, it is in fact contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in R v
Hutchinson. In this comment we argue that the approach taken in Kirkpatrick is correct and
consistent with the landmark decision in R v Ewanchuk. We urge the Supreme Court of
Canada to reconsider its majority judgment in Hutchinson in order to fully recognize the
central role that a condom plays in whether a woman agrees to participate in sexual
activity.

Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both
physical and psychological, of every individual. Having control
over who touches one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human
dignity and autonomy. The inclusion of assault and sexual
assault in the Code expresses society’s determination to protect
the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or
threats of force.1

Introduction
Condom sabotage and non-consensual condom removal are coercive sexual practices that
undermine women’s sexual autonomy, bodily integrity, and their right to decide in what sexual
activity they are willing to participate. It is deeply troubling that in 2020 we are still trying to sort
out the role of these practices in establishing consent to sexual activity. The majority decision of
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in R v Kirkpatrick2 constitutes an important step towards
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rectifying the damage done on this issue by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hutchinson.3 The
majority in Hutchinson is widely understood to have rejected condom use as integral to consent.4
In Kirkpatrick, the majority found that taking Hutchinson at face value “would leave the law of
Canada seriously out of touch with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of sexual
autonomy.”5 The majority judgment of Justice Groberman is a compelling takedown of the
majority judgment in Hutchinson, but it is phrased in the language of “they couldn’t possibly have
intended to say” what they did in fact say. The accused’s lawyer has indicated that he intends to
seek leave to appeal and thus Kirkpatrick presents the Supreme Court of Canada with a unique
opportunity to rethink one of its most flawed sexual assault decisions in recent decades. 6 The
decision in Hutchinson is fundamentally at odds with the landmark decision in Ewanchuk, which
defined the purpose of sexual assault law as protecting the “dignity and autonomy” of
complainants by providing control over “who touches one’s body, and how.”7
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In this comment we argue that the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hutchinson has led to
uncertainty regarding the role of condom use in consent to sexual activity. While the majority
judgment in Kirkpatrick takes an important step in moving away from Hutchinson, it is based on
making implausible distinctions between the facts in Kirkpatrick and those in Hutchinson. We can
only hope that the Supreme Court of Canada, when confronted with the confusing case law
Hutchinson has left in its wake, will uphold the decision of Justice Groberman and retreat from its
narrow four to three majority decision in Hutchinson.
This comment begins with a review of the decisions in Kirkpatrick and Hutchinson. Section II then
considers how lower courts have struggled with the impact of Hutchinson. In section III we briefly
review some of the social science evidence that demonstrates that condom sabotage and nonconsensual condom removal are much more widespread and pressing social concerns than the
Court acknowledged in Hutchinson. Finally, we conclude by arguing that there should be no
difference between tricking someone into believing a condom is being used and simply
disregarding a woman’s express requirement that a condom be used. Canadian criminal law must
recognize that when a person insists on condom use for sexual activity, that condom is a
fundamental component of the “sexual activity in question.”
I. Kirkpatrick and Hutchinson
1. R v Kirkpatrick
The facts in Kirkpatrick are unremarkable. The accused and the complainant met online and then
had one face-to-face meeting where the complainant set out her “sexual boundaries,”8 which
included that she would not consent to intercourse without a condom. While the complainant
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4
testified that the accused had agreed with her requirement, the accused denied that this discussion
took place.9 A few days later, as they were engaging in sexual activity, she asked the accused if he
had a condom and indicated that she had one if he did not. He reached into his side table, took out
a condom, put it on, and the two then had vaginal intercourse. She told him not to ejaculate inside
her vagina and he did not. Demonstrating her careful vigilance, she later asked to see the condom
to ensure one had been used and the accused showed it to her.10 At some point during the night,
the complainant awoke and realized that the accused was sexually aroused. She pushed him away
and he “rolled over to the same bedside table he had rolled to in order to put on a condom.”11 The
complainant testified that she did not hear him open the package or put on a condom, but that she
did not repeat her demand because she assumed that he would wear a condom given their
discussions and given that he had done so during intercourse earlier that night. She also testified
that “she would never have consented to having sexual intercourse if she had known he was not
wearing a condom.”12 The two had intercourse again and, after he ejaculated, she realized that he
had not been wearing a condom. During an argument ensuing from this realization, Kirkpatrick
told her he had been “too excited to wear a condom”13 and that if she got pregnant she could have
an abortion.14 The complainant went to the emergency room and was put on HIV prophylactics for
28 days “from which she suffered serious side effects.”15 The accused later sent her links to
pornography entitled “OMG Daddy came inside me” and other texts described by Justice Bennett
as “abusive.”16
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There were two potential routes by which Kirkpatrick could have been convicted of sexual assault.
First, following Hutchinson, the trial judge could have found that he deceived the complainant
about condom use and thus that any consent she gave was vitiated by fraud because there was a
significant risk of serious bodily harm through an increased risk of pregnancy for the
complainant.17 Second, in an approach most legal commentators thought had been ruled out by
Hutchinson,18 the judge could have held that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity
in question—intercourse without a condom—and hence that there was no consent.
The difficulty with the fraud route was that the evidence was unclear as to whether the accused
had actually deceived the complainant into thinking he was using a condom or whether he just
proceeded, not caring that the complainant had insisted on condom use. If the latter, it is difficult
to conceptualize the accused’s actions as fraud vitiating consent because there was no dishonesty
as is required by fraud. The trial judge found that there was no deception and that the accused had
not tried to trick the complainant into believing he was using a condom.
The accused did nothing to hide or deceive the complainant that he did not put on a
condom. Within a minute of the commencement of [the second incident of] intercourse,
the accused asked her if it felt better this way. She unfortunately mistook the inference
that the accused was making, and said yes.
Also, he asked her to guide his penis into her vagina at one point, which strongly
suggests that he was not hiding the fact that he was not wearing a condom.
Accordingly, I am unable to find any evidence of dishonesty on the part of the accused
that could result in a conviction.19
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After finding no deception, the trial judge, following Hutchinson, concluded that the failure to
wear a condom did not negate consent to the sexual activity in question. As a result, the trial judge
granted the no evidence motion brought by the defence and acquitted the accused. The Court of
Appeal unanimously set aside the acquittal and remitted the matter back to provincial court for a
new trial. While the judges were unanimous that the trial judge erred in granting the no evidence
motion, they were divided, as in Hutchinson, about the appropriate route to that conviction.
2. R v Hutchinson
In order to understand Kirkpatrick, it is necessary to describe in some detail the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Hutchinson. In that case, despite the complainant’s repeated insistence that
her then boyfriend wear condoms, he deliberately cut holes in them for the purpose of impregnating
her against her wishes; the complainant became pregnant, had an abortion, and suffered significant
complications.20 The Court was unanimous that this behaviour constituted sexual assault, but was
deeply divided on the means for arriving at that conclusion. That division is precisely what led to
the disagreement in Kirkpatrick.
Consent in the Criminal Code is defined as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage
in the sexual activity in question.”21 As in Kirkpatrick, there were two possible routes to criminal
liability for Hutchinson depending on the meaning the Court gave to the words “the sexual activity
in question.”22 If the sexual activity to which the complainant must consent is sex with a sabotaged
condom or, effectively, with no condom, then the Hutchinson complainant never agreed to “the
sexual activity in question”23 and there was no consent to sexual activity. However, if the sexual
20

See Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 2; R v Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1 at para 8; R v Hutchinson, 2009 NSSC 51 at
para 10.
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activity in question is defined simply as vaginal intercourse, regardless of whether a condom is
used, then the accused’s behaviour did not negate the complainant’s voluntary agreement. In that
scenario, the accused could be convicted only through the doctrine of fraud vitiating an otherwise
valid consent because he deceived the complainant about the condom and that led to a significant
risk of serious bodily harm, in her case unwanted pregnancy.
The majority judgment, written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Cromwell, held that the
meaning of “sexual activity in question” does not include whether a condom is used; this is a
collateral condition that does not go to the initial inquiry of whether the complainant voluntarily
agreed to the sexual activity. The majority held that for the purposes of defining whether a woman
consented, agreement to intercourse with a condom is no different than agreement to condom-less
intercourse, irrespective of the complainant’s clear insistence on protected sex. In other words, a
woman consents to engaging in vaginal intercourse and not to how that vaginal intercourse is
carried out. The following passage is critical for understanding the majority judgment:
We conclude that Farrar J.A. was correct to interpret the “sexual activity in
question” in s. 273.1(1) to refer simply to the physical sex act itself (for example,
kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of sex toys). The complainant must
agree to the specific physical sex act. For example, as our colleagues correctly note,
agreement to one form of penetration is not agreement to any or all forms of
penetration and agreement to sexual touching on one part of the body is not
agreement to all sexual touching.
The “sexual activity in question” does not include conditions or qualities of the
physical act, such as birth control measures or the presence of sexually transmitted
diseases. Thus, at the first stage of the consent analysis, the Crown must prove a
lack of subjective voluntary agreement to the specific physical sex act. Deceptions
about conditions or qualities of the physical act may vitiate consent under
s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, if the elements for fraud are met.24

24
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The Hutchinson majority set out a two-step approach to consent. The first step is to determine
whether consent to the sexual activity in question has been given. This inquiry is limited to three
factors: the complainant must consent to the touching, the sexual nature of the act, and she must
know the identity of the person with whom she is engaging in the activity. How the sexual act is
performed, the circumstances around it, and the risks that attend it are not included within this first
step. If one of these three limited factors is not present, there is no consent. If they are all present,
consent can still be vitiated by fraud—considered in the second step—in cases where the deception
by the accused creates a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Because the majority took the
fraud route, it was necessary to find a significant risk of serious bodily harm in order for consent
to be vitiated, and it held that increasing the risk of an unwanted pregnancy met that threshold.25
Drawing on the doctrine of fraud established in the context of HIV nondisclosure, the judgment
endorsed a concept of sexual fraud that is focused on the risk of physical harm, thus occluding the
dignitary harms that result from being penetrated with a penis sheathed in a condom that has been
deliberately sabotaged. In this way, deception, and the harm of sexual assault more generally, is
mischaracterized as purely physical, rather than a violation of sexual autonomy.
Hutchinson appears to have been motivated by the majority’s concern about overextending HIV
nondisclosure criminalization beyond that prescribed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v
Cuerrier26 and R v Mabior.27 HIV groups intervened in coalition in Hutchinson to argue that
liability needed to be limited to the doctrine of fraud vitiating consent to avoid the possibility of
expanding the scope of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions.28 If voluntary agreement to “the sexual

25
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activity in question” could be negated by failure to wear a condom, the concern was that it could
also be negated by other collateral conditions such as the failure to disclose one’s HIV status. This
would allow for conviction for HIV nondisclosure even where there was no significant risk of
bodily harm, the limit placed on fraud in Cuerrier to prevent prosecuting nondisclosure where
there is no significant risk of HIV transmission. The majority explicitly equated the facts in
Hutchinson with the facts in Cuerrier, a case involving a man who failed to disclose his HIV status
to two of his sexual partners.29 After rejecting that condom use went to the essence of consent, the
Hutchinson majority went on to hold that the complainant’s consent was vitiated through fraud
because the accused deceived her, she would not have consented had he not deceived her, and
there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm, which in this case actually materialized.
The minority judgment, penned by Justices Abella and Moldaver, by contrast held that “the sexual
activity in question” must include how that sexual activity is carried out, such as with the use of a
condom, and thus held that there had been no consent to the sexual activity in question.30 The heart
of the disagreement between the minority and majority judgments was “whether the use of a
condom is included in the manner in which the sexual activity is carried out.”31 The significance
of the majority judgment was not lost on the minority:
The right to determine how sexual touching is to occur clearly encompasses a
person’s right to determine where one’s body is touched and by what means. At its
core, this case concerns the right recognized in Ewanchuk to determine how sexual
touching will take place.32

29
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The minority concluded that “without voluntary agreement as to the ‘how’—the manner in which
the sexual activity in question occurred—there is no consent within the meaning of s. 273.1(1).”33
The minority did limit its judgment, however, so that consent includes only how the sexual
touching is carried out and does not include other conditions that the complainant might put on her
consent:
A person consents to how she will be touched, and she is entitled to decide what
sexual activity she agrees to engage in for whatever reason she wishes. The fact
that some of the consequences of her motives are more serious than others, such as
pregnancy, does not in the slightest undermine her right to decide the manner of the
sexual activity she wants to engage in. . . . [Consent] does not, however, require
consent to the consequences of that touching, or the characteristics of the sexual
partner, such as age, wealth, marital status, or health. These consequences or
characteristics, while potentially significant, are not part of the actual physical
activity that is agreed to. If we included them in the meaning of the sexual activity
in question under s. 273.1(1), we would be criminalizing activity that thwarts the
motives of a complainant, instead of focusing on the unwanted physical activity that
actually took place.34

The majority judgment in Hutchinson is deeply problematic. We have already seen it extended to
justify a narrow scope to capacity to consent in R v Al-Rawi.35 In R v Barton,36 the Criminal
Lawyers’ Association of Ontario argued in the Supreme Court of Canada that, following
Hutchinson, consent does not include agreement to the amount of force used to carry out the sexual
activity in question.37 A finding that force is not a component of subjective consent would seriously
threaten women’s dignity, bodily integrity and, as we saw in Barton, their lives.

33
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3. Distinguishing Hutchison in R v Kirkpatrick
This takes us back to the Court of Appeal decision in Kirkpatrick. The logic of the Kirkpatrick
majority appears to be that the majority decision in Hutchinson was so deeply flawed that the
majority could not possibly have intended to say what it did actually say. As the majority in
Kirkpatrick writes, the application of this approach to the facts of Kirkpatrick would completely
fail to protect sexual autonomy.38 Justice Groberman held that the complainant here did not consent
to sex without a condom and therefore the accused could have been convicted of sexual assault
without the doctrine of fraud. The majority doubled down on its commitment to following
Hutchinson by stating, in our view incorrectly, that “[n]othing in [the majority judgment in
Hutchinson] suggests that there was an intention … to specifically exclude from the definition of
‘the sexual activity in question’ physical aspects of sexual activity adopted for birth control or
disease prevention purposes”39 and that “there is nothing in the majority judgment that expressly
disagrees with the common-sense proposition that sexual intercourse with a condom is a different
sexual activity from sexual intercourse without a condom.”40 With respect, this was precisely what
differentiated the majority judgment from the minority judgment in Hutchinson. Justice
Groberman is correct that this interpretation by the majority is fundamentally flawed, or in his
words, “perverse”41 because it “prevent[s] a person from limiting their consent in a manner that is
intimately related to their personal autonomy and the public interest.”42 But this is exactly what
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Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 3.
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the Court decided in Hutchinson and this is specifically what triggered the minority to write
separate reasons including how that sexual activity is carried out within “the sexual activity in
question”.
The majority in Kirkpatrick differentiated between a man who tricks his partner into thinking they
are having sex with a condom by cutting holes in it, knowing she would not consent otherwise,
and a man who just does not care that his partner insisted on condom use. The former scenario
(Hutchinson) does not go to the essence of voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual activity in
question while the latter (Kirkpatrick) does:
This is not a case, like Hutchinson, where the physical act (sexual intercourse with a
condom) was consented to, and the only issue was the state of the condom, something
that would have been imperceptible, except on close examination using an instrument
such as a magnifying glass or microscope. Nor is this a case where the relevant
condition is unconnected with the physical acts (for example, the question of whether
a party has a sexually transmissible infection, is sterile, or has a particular social
standing). Rather, this is a case about the sexual activity that the complainant consented
to. On her evidence, she did not consent to the accused penetrating her with his
unsheathed penis.43

Justice Groberman went on to reject fraud in this case because fraud requires deception and
there was no evidence of deception here. He acknowledged that fraud can be passive or active,
and that deliberately remaining silent or taking no action can constitute fraud.44 But a failure
on the part of the accused to keep a promise—that he would use a condom—is not in and of
itself fraudulent.45 He ended with the following caution:
While the fraud provisions of the Code are adequate to deal with situations in which a
person deceives a sexual partner by providing them with false information, they offer
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no protection to a person who sets limits on the conditions of sexual activity if their
partner simply chooses to ignore those limits.46

If this is correct, then the precise limits imposed by the Hutchinson judgment become more
important. Hutchinson limited consent by excluding condom use and other components of how
the sexual activity takes place from the scope of consent. Kirkpatrick attempted to reinvigorate
consent but also to limit the doctrine of fraud, an approach with which we agree. Some clarity
on the proper relationship between these concepts is important, especially because, as we
discuss below, the failure to comply with a complainant’s insistence on condom use can be
either deceptive or overt.
The minority judgment of Justice Bennett in Kirkpatrick started from the premise that “it is
abundantly clear that Canadian law permits a person to limit their consent to intercourse by
insisting a condom be used,”47 a statement that is not entirely correct after Hutchinson.48 She was,
however, deeply critical of the majority’s approach to consent because it “fails to apply binding
Supreme Court of Canada authority” 49 from Hutchinson. Justice Bennett clearly believed that the
acquittal needed to be quashed, but she did so by maintaining the narrow version of the scope of
consent from Hutchinson but, correspondingly, expanding the doctrine of fraud. She first made the
case that the Hutchinson majority did not intend for condom use to be part of the consent inquiry,
citing the following statement from the majority judgment in Hutchinson :“[o]n the approach we
propose, the ‘sexual activity in question’ was the sexual intercourse that took place in this case.
Effective condom use is a method of contraception and protection against sexually transmitted

46
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49
Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 45.
47

14
disease; it is not a sex act.”50 According to Justice Bennett, accepting the judgment of Justice
Groberman would mean either that the majority did not think condom use is a method of
contraception, or, quite implausibly, that the minority in Hutchinson did not understand the
reasoning of the majority. Further, she held that the majority had explicitly rejected the “essential
features” approach to sexual activity whereby using a condom would be an essential feature of the
sexual activity to which a complainant must consent. Putting these three reasons together, she
concluded that there was no plausible reading of Hutchinson other than that condom use was not
intended to be part of the first step of the consent inquiry.51
She went on to hold, however, that the trial judge had erred in requiring evidence of overt
dishonesty to meet the evidentiary threshold for fraud vitiating consent52 when “[t]here was ample
evidence that [the complainant] would not consent to sexual intercourse without a condom and, on
her evidence, Mr. Kirkpatrick was well aware of this, yet he failed to disclose that he was not
wearing one.”53 This was enough to send it back for a new trial.
Justice Saunders broke the tie in this case. He agreed with Justice Groberman that Hutchinson
allowed for a conviction on the basis that the complainant did not consent to unprotected sex, and
with Justice Bennett that, if that was wrong, there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to
consider fraud vitiating consent.54

50

Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added by Bennett JA], citing Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 64.
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II. The case law on condom use
We have both argued elsewhere that the majority judgment in Hutchinson was profoundly flawed
in principle and undermines complainant autonomy and equality in serious ways.55 We now turn
to a brief review of the case law following Hutchinson to demonstrate that the Court in Kirkpatrick
is not alone in struggling with how to follow the Supreme Court’s guidance while still doing justice
in the case before it.
Crown counsel has tried to argue that a woman’s consent to sexual intercourse was premised on
their sexual partner’s use of a condom in three cases since Hutchinson. As in Kirkpatrick, these
cases show judges struggling to understand whether and how Hutchinson applies to the facts,
sometimes squeezing allegations that do not involve deception into the fraud analysis established
by the Supreme Court. Convictions seem to be more likely when there is an evidentiary foundation
to ground a finding of a significant risk of unwanted pregnancy or a sexually transmitted infection.
R v Dadmand56 is a disturbing case that involved both an elaborate sexual scam, as well as an
instance of what has come to be referred to as “stealthing”—the surreptitious removal of a condom
during sexual activity.57 Posing as a modelling agent, the accused had concocted a highly
orchestrated scheme to induce young women to participate in sexual acts with him on video.58 At
trial, he was convicted of numerous counts of sexual assault against seven complainants. The video
evidence showed him engaging in sexual activity with complainants who were verbally protesting
and asking him to stop. In two of these counts, he sexually assaulted complainants who were
unconscious. All of these complainants shared marginalized social locations. According to the
See Gotell, supra note 4 at 98; Grant, “The Impact of Cuerrier on Sexual Assault Law,” supra note 4.
2016 BCSC 1565 [Dadmand].
57
See Konrad Czechowski et al, “‘That’s Not What Was Originally Agreed To’: Perceptions, Outcomes, and Legal
Contextualization of Non-Consensual Condom Removal in a Canadian Sample” (2019) 14:7 PloS One 1 at 2.
58
See Dadmand, supra note 56 at paras 3–5.
55
56
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judge revoking the accused’s bail, Dadmand targeted “young women made vulnerable by their
hopes for success through an industry targeting their physical appearance.”59
Dadmand was shown engaging in non-consensual condom removal over the objections of one of
the complainants:
He directs her to assume various physical positions and perform various sex acts. At one
point, S.T. says “I hope we are almost done.” When the accused prepares to have
intercourse from behind her the second time, she says “We already did this.” She requests
the accused to put on a condom. After he does so, he removes it when he is behind her.
S.T. later observes the accused is not wearing the condom, and comments “The condom is
not even on.” S.T. puts the condom on again, and then the accused removes it when S.T.
turns her back to him.60

The Crown was constrained by Hutchinson on this count and ultimately argued no consent because
the complainant did not know the true identity of the accused and would never have consented had
she known he was not a modelling agent. Justice Pearlman rejected this argument stating, “S.T.
was not deceived as to the identity in the narrow sense”,61and acquitted Dadmand on this count of
sexual assault.62
The legal response to non-consensual condom removal in Dadmand appears pre-determined by
the narrow definition of the “sexual activity in question” offered by the majority in Hutchinson.
Justice Pearlman’s discussion of Hutchinson at the outset of the decision emphasized how “the
need for restraint and certainty has influenced the law’s approach to consent, particularly where
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consent has been obtained by deception”.63 Therefore, deception capable of vitiating consent
(through the doctrine of fraud) must “carry with it the risk of serious harm.”64 As Justice Pearlman
stressed, the Crown failed to lead any evidence to support the existence of a “significant risk”
sufficient to ground the invalidation of consent by fraud.65 Here, unlike in Hutchinson, there was
no evidence presented that that the complainant was at increased risk of unwanted pregnancy, nor
did she have a significant risk of contracting a sexually transmitted infection.. Justice Pearlman
offered no specific analysis of the condom removal. Despite the fact that Dadmand could be
observed on video twice removing the condom over the complainant’s verbal objection, the
decision appears to assume her voluntary agreement, failing to even consider whether she was
consenting to the sexual activity in question. In this decision, then, an act of non-consensual
condom removal, as well as the accused’s sexual scamming, are placed beyond the scope of
criminal law through reliance on Hutchinson.
In two recent Ontario cases, the accused’s condom removal was more directly considered, though
much like Kirkpatrick, both decisions demonstrate significant judicial confusion about the
application of the Hutchinson test. This confusion can be seen in the different approaches taken at
trial and on appeal in R v Lupi.66 The facts of Lupi are similar to those in Kirkpatrick. The accused
and the complainant were casual acquaintances, having met on an internet dating site and having
shared lunch and several texts.67 On the evening of the sexual assault, they went for dinner and
returned to Mr. Lupi’s apartment. The accused admitted to being aware that the complainant had
consented to penetrative sex with a condom only:
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At one point, after I said no [to whether he had a condom] and she reaches for her
clothes and she makes her way to get…dressed again, it’s absolutely clear that the
sex is not happening without a condom. That is when I realized the condom is
clearly a deal breaker.68

The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence that, once they had begun penetrative sex, she
heard a “‘snap’ like a rubber band after they changed sexual positions, and Mr. Lupi moved behind
her.”69 As she claimed, “Mr. Lupi continued to penetrate her for about 5 seconds before she figured
out that Mr. Lupi had removed the condom.”70
On the basis of these facts, the trial judge convicted the accused. Like the majority in Kirkpatrick,
he distinguished these facts from those in Hutchinson. While the Kirkpatrick majority decision
rests on a distinction between condom sabotage and condom removal, the trial judge in Lupi held
that, unlike in Hutchinson, there was clearly “no consent to penetration without [a] condom at the
time of the sexual intercourse.”71 Non-consensual condom removal was thus treated as constituting
a lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question, because the complainant had never
agreed to engage in unprotected intercourse. Significantly, this analytic approach enables
recognition of harms posed by condom removal as a violation of the complainant’s consent. The
trial judge emphasized the important constitutional values at stake when someone removes a
condom without the consent of the complainant: “Mr. Lupi’s actions fundamentally affected Ms.
V’s consent. . . . [They] deprived her of control over her sexual activity” and “flew in the face of
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the Charter values of equality and autonomy.”72 If he was wrong in his approach, and Hutchinson
was not distinguishable, then the trial judge found that consent had been vitiated by fraud.73
On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge had misapprehended evidence suggesting
inconsistencies in the complainant’s statements and, critically, that Hutchinson was not
distinguishable from the facts of this case.74 Even if he was found to have engaged in unprotected
penetrative intercourse, the appellant argued that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that this vitiated an otherwise valid consent.75 In the Ontario Superior Court, Justice Roberts
rejected the Crown’s interpretation of “the sexual activity in question” on the basis that “[t]he
circumstances of this case appear to fall squarely within the Hutchinson paradigm.”76 Against the
complainant’s clear insistence that she had not subjectively consented to sexual activity without a
condom, Justice Roberts nevertheless concluded the only route to sexual assault was if her consent
was vitiated by fraud.77 Aside from the obvious paternalism of the law determining that a woman
has consented when she says she did not, and she is believed, the decision’s restricted definition
of the act legally consented to shows how Hutchinson has led to a radical narrowing of the scope
of consent, framing condom use as a collateral condition to the sexual activity in question.78
In analyzing whether the accused’s actions constituted fraud that invalidated the complainant’s
purported consent, Justice Roberts first found that the accused’s actions were dishonest on the
basis that they occurred behind the complainant.79 Second, following Hutchinson, the decision
analyzes whether this dishonesty constituted a serious risk of harm. Importantly, Justice Roberts
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suggested that the harms contemplated by Hutchinson as being capable of vitiating consent need
not be restricted to bodily harm and can include psychological harms.80 The decision recounts the
complainant’s clear trauma, emphasizing how she “cried every day [sic] for two months”81 and
how she sometimes feels “like [she is] not even in [her] body. Like [she] feel[s] faint and it’s hard
to focus.”82 Nevertheless, in analyzing the serious risk produced by the accused’s actions, the
decision focuses on evidence of physical harm. Unlike the majority in Kirkpatrick, Justice Roberts
insisted that condom sabotage and condom removal are analogous and that both “could give rise
to the risk of serious bodily harm”83 because the complainant had gone for prophylactic treatment
for pregnancy and STDs, including HIV,84 and thus had clearly experienced a risk of unwanted
pregnancy.85 In upholding the conviction, Justice Roberts concluded that the accused’s deception
had vitiated the complainant’s consent. Here, he emphasizes the primary significance of physical
and bodily harm:
In sum, it was readily apparent from the record that the harm here went well-beyond
“financial deprivations or mere sadness or stress from being lied to” [quoting from
Hutchinson] and extended to serious bodily harm, or the risk of serious bodily harm, both
by substantially interfering with Ms. V’s well-being, and exposing her to the risk of an
unwanted pregnancy.86

This case highlights the problems with the fraud analysis. On the one hand, the complainant’s
emotional and dignitary harms are minimized, constructed as “mere sadness” while, on the other
hand, if psychological harms are sufficient to ground fraud, then all of the efforts to limit HIV
nondisclosure prosecutions to cases where there is a significant risk of transmission are
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undermined. In other words, the narrow construction of “sexual activity in question,” motivated in
Hutchinson by the desire to limit HIV nondisclosure prosecutions, has led courts to expand fraud
which in turn has the potential to expand HIV nondisclosure prosecutions precisely in the way the
Hutchinson Court sought to prevent.
The decision in R v Rivera87 rests on an almost identical set of facts as Lupi and Kirkpatrick. The
complainant and the accused had met on an online dating website. Prior to meeting in person, they
exchanged messages in which the complainant made it crystal clear that her consent was limited
to sex with a condom. The complainant had texted the accused that she had two rules: “condoms
were a must and ‘no means no.’” 88
When the accused arrived at the complainant’s residence, they engaged in consensual kissing and
foreplay.89 While the accounts provided by the accused and the complainant diverged on the events
that followed, Judge Champagne preferred the testimony of the complainant. The fact that the
complainant went to the hospital the next day for a pregnancy test, sexually transmitted infection
testing, and a sexual assault kit was cited as weighing in favour of her credibility.90 Judge
Champagne also found significant inconsistencies and misleading statements in the accused’s
testimony.91
While this case was presented in the media as a case about surreptitious condom removal,92 the
facts are clear that the accused deliberately ignored the complainant’s verbal consent to vaginal
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intercourse with a condom only. The complainant testified that when the accused penetrated her
without a condom she froze and “laid there limp.”93 On the face of it, this a clear description of
non-consent, of a lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question. The complainant’s
testimony, accepted as credible by the trial judge, was that she was never in a state of voluntary
agreement to the penetrative sexual intercourse at the time it was occurring. The Supreme Court
in Ewanchuk made clear that silence and ambiguity do not constitute consent.94 As the trial judge
concluded without the complainant's agreement, failure to use a condom is a violation of her sexual
autonomy:
In my view, sex without a condom is a qualitatively different act than sex with a
condom and the complainant’s consent was withdrawn when Mr. Rivera penetrated
her without a condom without her overt agreement. When a condom is used as a
form of birth control or to prevent sexually transmitted infections, its use provides
participants with a sense of security. The non-use of a condom against a
participant’s wishes not only usurps that individuals sexual autonomy and right to
make decisions about how she/he/they engage in sexual activity, it is an activity
against that person’s will, fraught with the gamit [sic] of emotions resulting from
an assault.95

In emphasizing the violation of the complainant’s autonomy, the trial judge followed an approach
like the one advanced by the concurring minority judgment in Hutchinson. She held that
intercourse with a condom is a different sexual activity then intercourse without a condom.96 As
in the trial decision in Lupi, this framing provided scope for acknowledging the dignitary harms
of non-consensual condom removal. Judge Champagne, perhaps anticipating appeal, offered an
alternate path to conviction: “If there is any doubt that sex without a condom amounts to sexual
assault in these circumstances, I find that the complainant’s consent was vitiated by fraud (s.265(3)
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Criminal Code).”97 However, this unnecessarily stretches the concept of fraud because there was
no deception whatsoever in this case; the accused simply disregarded the complainant’s wishes.
As noted by the majority in Kirkpatrick, this broad interpretation of deception conflates the failure
to keep a promise with fraud.98
Like the Court of Appeal in Kirkpatrick, the judge in Rivera was pushing back against the majority
judgment in Hutchinson because, if its logic were applied to the facts of this case, the coercive
actions of the accused and the resulting violation of the complainant’s sexual autonomy and agency
would escape legal recognition as sexual assault. Since there was no effort in Rivera to deceive
the complainant, following the two-step analysis established by Hutchinson wouldhave lead to the
same result as in the trial decision in Kirkpatrick – an acquittal for the accused.99
Reading Dadmand, Lupi and Rivera together with Kirkpatrick underscores the troubling
jurisprudential legacy of the Hutchinson majority’s approach to allegations involving nonconsensual condom removal. After all, what really distinguishes the circumstances of these cases?
Why is it that a brief moment during which someone does not yet realize that the condom has been
removed may be enough to render one form of condom removal sexual assault, while those who
accomplish condom-less sex through undisguised coercion, such as the accused in Rivera, would
be viewed as less blameworthy? As we contend, there is no principled approach for distinguishing
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these situations, particularly when both rest upon the objectification of the complainant and the
erasure of her sexual agency.
Comparing the decision in Dadmand with those in Lupi and Rivera suggests that non-consensual
condom removal may be more likely to result in a conviction for sexual assault when complainants
undergo pregnancy and/or sexually transmitted infection testing and treatment. In this way, the
harms of either failing to wear or removing a condom are defined as being primarily physical,
erasing the serious violations of sexual autonomy and equality that occur when a woman’s explicit
consent to sex only with a condom is overridden.
III. The realities of non-consensual condom removal
The egregious actions of the accused in Hutchinson—tampering with condoms to render his sexual
partner pregnant in hopes of trapping her in a failing relationship—falls within a category of
behaviours labelled “reproductive coercion.”100 Reproductive coercion undermines the sexual and
reproductive autonomy of women and disproportionately affects those who are experiencing
intimate partner violence.101 As many as 15 per cent of women report having experienced
contraceptive sabotage.102 Neither the scope of the problem nor any of this literature was
considered when the Supreme Court decided Hutchinson. As Kirkpatrick and the other decisions
reviewed here suggest, the Court also appears to have not appreciated the full range of consent
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violations involving condom use. Social science research demonstrates that non-consensual
condom removal in its diverse forms constitutes a widespread form of gender-based violence
located at the juncture between sexual autonomy, consent, and sexual violence.
In 2017, Alexandra Brodsky published a widely-cited commentary on this issue in which she
reviewed the legal complexities of surreptitious condom removal within the context of American
law.103 Her analysis of stealthing as a consent violation and as a form of gender-based violence
sparked a widespread public conversation104 and drew attention to the motivations of those who
perpetrate it. Brodsky described the online communities where men share their experiences and
techniques, and where stealthing is justified through misogynist discourses, exemplified by one
man’s assertion of his right to “‘spread [his] seed.’”105 Drawing on qualitative interviews with a
small number of survivors, she also interrogated how women understand the harms they
experienced. While all of these survivors feared the consequences of deceptive condom removal
(unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections),106 Brodsky emphasized how they
viewed stealthing as a “disempowering, demeaning violation of a sexual agreement.”107 These
survivors, like the women in the cases discussed, felt their agency was removed, and
conceptualized stealthing as an act of control.
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Brodsky’s article was extensively shared and discussed in the media, not because, as some
suggested, it identified a new phenomenon, but instead because it allowed women to label an
unnamed, yet widespread experience. There is burgeoning social science literature on “condom
use resistance,” which refers to attempts to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse with a partner
who wants to use a condom. One frequently cited empirical study found that 80 per cent of young
heterosexual men surveyed had used at least one condom use resistance strategy since
adolescence.108 The uses of coercion and deception to avoid wearing a condom are not uncommon.
A nationwide American survey of young heterosexual men found that 35 percent reported having
used physical force, manipulation, threats, and deception to obtain unprotected sex with a partner
who wanted to use a condom, with 31 per cent of the sample reporting having successfully used
these tactics on more than one occasion.109 In an effort to determine the factors associated with
non-consensual condom removal, Davis et al concluded that having a sexual assault perpetration
history is predictive of an intention to engage in this practice, and that men who hold misogynist
beliefs have a much higher likelihood of committing it.110
Recent empirical research is also documenting how widespread this experience is among both
women and men who have penetrative sex with men. Two recent studies examined the prevalence
and impacts of non-consensual condom removal.111 These studies sought to capture a full range
of non-consensual condom removal experiences, including both deceptive and non-deceptive
forms (condom removal without permission with the sex continuing unwillingly, condom removal

See Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Young Men’s Condom Use Resistance Tactics: A Latent Profile Analysis” (2014) 51:4
J Sex Research 454 at 459.
109
See Kelly Cue Davis & Patricia Logan-Greene, “Young Men’s Aggressive Tactics to Avoid Condom Use: A Test
of a Theoretical Model” (2012) 36:3 Social Work Research 223 at 226.
110
See Kelly Cue Davis, “‘Stealthing’: Factors Associated with Young Men’s Nonconsensual Condom Removal”
(2019) 38:11 Health Psychology 997 at 998–99.
111
See Rosie L Latimer et al, “Non-Consensual Condom Removal, Reported by Patients at a Sexual Health Clinic in
Melbourne, Australia” (2018) 13:12 PLoS One 1; Czechowski et al, supra note 57.
108

27
without permission with the sex discontinued, condom removal during sex with the survivor only
realizing afterwards, and a condom never put on despite being requested). This empirical research
points to extremely high rates of non-consensual condom removal, with approximately one-third
of women and one-fifth of men in both studies reporting having been violated in this manner.112
Like the women interviewed by Brodsky, many participants in a Canadian study surveying
undergraduate students cited the risk of physical consequences (unwanted pregnancies and
sexually transmitted infections) in their explanations of why they viewed non-consensual condom
removal as wrong.113 However, most viewed it negatively specifically because of a lack of
consent.114In open-ended responses, 61 per cent of women participants described non-consensual
condom removal as a violation of consent, 15 per cent saw it as a betrayal of trust, and 5 per cent
labelled it as sexual violence.115
Control over women’s sexuality and reproduction has long been a fundamental component of their
systemic inequality. Non-consensual condom removal denies the survivor the specificity of her
own being, constructing her sexuality as a means to the perpetrator’s ends. This objectification
reinforces male-dominated heterosexuality and women’s inequality more generally, by denying
women’s status as sexual subjects, equally deserving of the ability to control their own sexuality.
By restrictively defining “sexual activity in question” in a manner that excludes condom use, the
Hutchinson framework assumes consent, intensifying this denial of women’s personhood. And by
focusing the law’s gaze myopically on deception that creates a risk of bodily harm, not only are
non-deceptive forms of non-consensual condom removal placed beyond the reach of sexual assault
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law, the dignitary violations and inequality-reinforcing impacts of these practices are also
obscured. The right to insist on a condom should not be limited to women who are capable of
becoming pregnant or to situations where a sexual partner has an STI. The exercise of sexual
autonomy surely must include the right to choose whether or not one is willing to participate in
condom-less sex. The choice around whether to use a condom is fundamentally connected to the
degree of intimacy one is willing to share with a particular sexual partner.
Conclusion
The majority judgment in Kirkpatrick premised its analysis on the idea that there is a
fundamental difference between a man who ignores a woman’s insistence on condom use and
a man who instead sabotages a condom such that effectively no condom is being used. In our
view, both scenarios undermine the fundamental choice that the law guarantees to all
Canadians to decide how and when they are willing to engage in sexual activity.
The complainants in Hutchinson and Kirkpatrick consented only to sex with a condom. Both
women wrongly believed they were having sex with a condom. Neither woman had the
protection offered by a condom, and neither was able to set limits on the level of sexual
intimacy in which she was willing to engage. The only difference between these cases is that
in Hutchinson the accused knowingly used a condom he had sabotaged, and in Kirkpatrick the
accused penetrated the complainant without a condom. This factual distinction should be
legally insignificant. All of the cases discussed in this comment demonstrate how the
complainants’ wishes to engage in sexual activity only if a condom was used were flatly
ignored by the men in question. Condom use was a fundamental component of the consent that
all of these women provided and, without it, be that by deception or by willful disregard, the
sexual activity was non-consensual. The use of a condom was not, somehow, collateral to these
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complainants’ consent. To situate condom use as separate from, or inessential to, decisionmaking about the “sexual activity in question” is artificial. Such a constrained interpretation of
the scope of consent ignores the subjective experience of complainants, which is doctrinally at
the heart of the consent inquiry.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk made clear that consent is assessed from the
perspective of the complainant and whether she wants the sexual activity to take place.116 None
of these women wanted the sexual activity that happened to take place. All of these women
went to police to report having been sexually assaulted. Condom use, just like the degree of
force involved in sexual activity, is so fundamental to whether a woman wants the sexual
activity to take place that it simply cannot be divorced from it. To treat condom use as being
outside the scope of the consent inquiry narrows the meaning of consent to sexual activity,
with serious consequences for women’s sexual autonomy, dignity, and equality.
The reader might wonder why it matters which route we take so long as fraud can get us to
conviction for sexual assault. It matters in the narrow context because fraud only leads to a
conviction where there is a deception and a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Because
Kirkpatrick was an appeal from a no evidence motion, the minority judgment of Justice Bennett
had to determine only that there was some evidence of a deception that could lead to a fraud
analysis. She concluded that there was some evidence of deception on the weak basis that the
complainant testified that before initiating intercourse, the accused rolled over towards the cabinet
beside his bed where he had obtained a condom earlier that night. There was more evidence that
the accused simply did not care that the complainant had insisted on a condom. However, Justice
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Bennett did not need to go on to examine the risk of serious bodily harm. If that risk were satisfied
because of an increased risk of pregnancy, then only those who are capable of becoming pregnant
are entitled to insist on a condom. A woman who is already pregnant or unable to get pregnant, or
a man having sex with a man, has no right to insist on condom use unless the partner has an STI.
If the risk of serious bodily harm was the fact that the complainant had to take HIV prophylactics
and suffered serious side effects, that approach would undermine the whole point of Cuerrier and
Hutchinson, which together limit prosecutions for HIV nondisclosure to cases where there is a
significant risk of actual transmission of HIV.
In the bigger picture, the meaning of consent matters. As Lise Gotell has argued elsewhere, the
result of Hutchinson is not simply to insulate trivial lies or insignificant collateral conditions from
criminal responsibility. Instead, “a narrow scope of consent focused on categories of physical
sexual acts, combined with the concept of fraud conflated with bodily harm, works against the
legal recognition of serious (and ‘reprehensible’) acts of male sexual predation.”117
We understand that, if an appeal is brought, the Supreme Court of Canada will be reluctant to
overrule a case that was decided less than a decade ago, even though the justices were deeply
divided and did not have the benefit of any feminist interveners or the above-cited social
science evidence before them. The simplest option would be to uphold the majority decision
of Kirkpatrick which distinguishes between deceptive non-condom use and the deliberate
disregard of a partner’s insistence on condom use. The preferable approach would be a strong
retreat from Hutchinson and, at the least, support for the minority judgment in Hutchinson
which recognized that how a man penetrates a woman is highly relevant to whether she wants
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that sexual activity to take place. As the minority insisted, everyone has the right to decide
what sexual activity they wish to engage in, including the specific form of sexual touching and
how it will occur. Sexual intercourse with a condom is a different form of sexual activity than
being touched by an unsheathed penis. The majority judgment in Kirkpatrick must be upheld.
To decide otherwise, by narrowly defining the sexual activity in question, radically undermines
Canada’s affirmative consent standard.
We also recognize that a broader approach to “the sexual activity in question” runs the risk of
expanding the scope of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions to cases where there is no realistic
possibility of transmission. This was the very fear that motivated the Hutchinson majority from
the outset. As we have argued elsewhere, the problem here stems from HIV nondisclosure
prosecutions being inappropriately subsumed under the crime of sexual assault. This relatively
small number of prosecutions have twisted and distorted our understanding of consent, fraud,
and even capacity.118 There are legitimate policy reasons to exercise restraint in prosecuting
HIV nondisclosure.119 The way to exercise that restraint is to remove what is a relatively small
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number of HIV nondisclosure cases from sexual assault altogether, not to distort sexual assault
law generally in ways that deny the law’s protection to tens of thousands of Canadian women.

